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I.

Canada Airline Competition Developments

Canada's Competition Bureau (the Bureau) announced on October 24, 2012 that it had
reached an agreement with Air Canada and United Continental Holdings, Inc. allowing
the alliance partners to pursue a proposed joint venture (the Consent Agreement), subject
to the exclusion of fourteen routes between Canada and the United States on which cooperation would be prohibited.' The settlement was reached days before the commencement of a public hearing, which may have resulted in a precedent-setting impact on
transborder and potentially global airline alliances operating to or from Canada.
On June 27, 2011, the Canadian Commissioner of Competition filed a Notice of Application with the Canadian Competition Tribunal, pursuant to Sections 90.1 and 92 of the
Competition Act (the Act), for orders prohibiting Air Canada, United Continental Holdings, Inc., United Airlines, Inc. (United), and Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental)
(collectively the Airlines) from entering into a proposed joint venture (the Proposed
Merger) intended to result in integration and coordination on Canada-U.S. transborder
routes. 2 The Commissioner also sought an order prohibiting the Airlines from engaging
in certain alliance agreements that had been in effect since 1995 and 1996 in the case of
United and since 2009 in the case of Continental.3 Those agreements (the Alliance
Agreements) provided for coordination of various aspects of their airline services, including pricing, inventory and yield management coordination, pooling of revenues, and route
and schedule planning for passenger airline services on many Canada-U.S. transborder
* The chapter was compiled by Gerald F. Murphy, a Partner in the Aviation and Corporate Groups at
Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C. Section I on Canadian Airline Competition Developments
was written by Catherine A. Pawluch, a Partner in the Aviation and Competition/Antitrust Law Group in the
Toronto office of Davis LLP. Section II on U.S. Aviation Legal Developments was written by Gerald F.
Murphy; Lorraine B. Halloway, a Partner in the Aviation and International Trade Groups at Crowell &
Moring LLP; and Steven J. Seiden, an Associate in the Aviation Group at Crowell & Moring LLP.
1. Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada, 2012 Comp. Trib. 2, available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/Cases
Affaires/CasesDetails-eng.asp?CaseID=348.
2. Notice of Application at 1-2, Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada, 2012 Comp. Trib. 1, available at
http-//www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-004 Notice%20of%20ApplicationI_45_6-27-2011.
3. See id. paras. 21, 24-25.
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routes. 4 Notably, approval by the U.S. Department of Transportation of these very same
Alliance Agreements did not deter the Commissioner from taking action against the
Airlines.
At its core, the case brought by the Commissioner against the Airlines was about competition in the airline industry. In the pleadings, the Commissioner asserted that the
"business activities proposed by the [Airlines], including 'net revenue'/profit sharing and
price and capacity coordination, allow the Airlines to harm Canadian consumers and the
Canadian economy by removing all incentives to compete with one another" and "in the
absence of an incentive to compete, regardless of what they claim, the [Airlines] will not
compete; to do otherwise would be irrational and violate their obligations to their respective shareholders."s
Initially, the Commissioner identified nineteen transborder routes where coordination
would result in a substantial lessening of competition. 6 But in the final analysis, the Bureau determined that competition on five of the routes originally identified was unlikely to
be substantially harmed as a result of the Airlines' coordination.7 Accordingly, the Consent Agreement remedy applies to fourteen city-pair routes. The Bureau also took the
extraordinary step of publishing the prospective, post-joint venture, combined market
share of Air Canada and United/Continental on these fourteen routes, which would have
been 100 percent on ten routes and exceeded 85 percent, on average, for the other four
routes. 8
With respect to the fourteen city-pair routes, the Consent Agreement prohibits Air
Canada and United/Continental from coordinating on key aspects of competition,
including:
* coordinating their prices,
* coordinating the number of seats available at each price,
* pooling revenue or costs, and
* sharing commercially sensitive information. 9
The Consent Agreement will remain in force for as long as any one of the Alliance
Agreements or the transborder joint venture remains in force. If there is a substantial
change to competition on one of the routes, the Consent Agreement provides that specific
prohibitions can be suspended or reinstated as appropriate.'o An independent monitor
will be appointed by the Bureau to ensure that Air Canada and United/Continental comply with the terms of the Consent Agreement."
4. Id.
5. Reply of the Comm'r of Competition para. 3, Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada, 2012 Comp.
Trib. 24, available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-004_Reply%20of%2Othe%2OCommissioner
%20of%20Competition24_38_8-29-2011_7614.pdf.
6. Notice of Application, supra note 2, para. 42.
7. See Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Reaches Agreement with Air Can.
and United Cont'1 (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03507.html.
8. Id.
9. Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada, 2012 Comp. Trib. 2, at 5, available at http-J/www.ct-tc.gc.ca/
CMFiles/CT-2012-001-Consent%20Agreement_2_45_10-24-2012_7871 .pdf.
10. Id. para. 4.
11. Id. para. 15.
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The challenge by the Bureau to the Air Canada and United/Continental agreements
and the settlement of this case may signal the beginning of an age of enforcement of the
recent 2009 amendments to the Act.' 2 The challenge was the first of its kind since
amendments to the Act came into force, establishing a new civil competitor collaboration
provision.' 3 Alliances and joint ventures between competitors in the transportation industry and other sectors may be future targets of scrutiny by the Bureau.
II.

U.S. Aviation Legal Developments

A.

CONSUMER PROTECTION RULES

Consumer protection issues continued to dominate U.S. regulatory developments in
the aviation sector during 2012, as the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT or Department) intensified its enforcement of the "Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections"
rule (EAPP #2 or the Rule)'4 and increased fines imposed for noncompliance with the rule
against U.S. and foreign carriers alike. Most of the Department's enforcement cases,
which were all settled by consent orders,i 5 involved alleged noncompliance with DOT's
full fare advertising rule (the Full Fare Rule),16 which requires that any advertised price
12. Section 90.1 and 92 of the Act are non-criminal provisions. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
Section 92 addresses mergers and proposed mergers that substantially prevent or lessen, or are likely to
substantially prevent or lessen, competition in a trade, industry, or profession. Id. Section 90.1 is a new
provision of the Act that addresses agreements or arrangements, whether existing or proposed, between competitors that substantially prevent or lessen, or are likely to substantially prevent or lessen, competition in a
market. Id.
13. Section 90.1 was enacted on March 12, 2009, but only came into force on March 12, 2010. To assist
firms in assessing the likelihood that a competitor collaboration will raise concerns under the civil provisions
of the Act and, if so, whether the Commissioner would commence an inquiry regarding the collaboration, the
Competition Bureau, an independent law enforcement agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Act, published the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines on December 23, 2009. See generally CAN. Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines: Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, Preface and
Interpretation (Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/
Competitor-Collaboration-Guidelines-e-2009-12-22.pdf/$FILE/Competitor-Collaboration-Guidelines-e2009-12-22.pdf.
14. See EnhancingAirline PassengerProtections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 (2012). As reported in the 2010 Year-InReview, the first Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections rule required, among other things, that each U.S.
carrier adopt a contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays containing an assurance that the carrier will not
permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac at a U.S. airport for more than three hours for domestic flights and
for more than a carrier-determined number of hours for international flights without providing passengers an
opportunity to deplane. See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 30, 2009);
MarkJ. Andrews, James H. Bergeron, Leendert Creyf, Catherine Erkelens, Lorraine B. Halloway, Gerald F.
Murphy & Douglas Schmitt, InternationalTransportation Lm, 45 Lr'T'L LAW. 313 (2010). EAPP #2 subsequently extended the tarmac delay rule to foreign carriers and imposed a four-hour limit on international
flights. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 259.4.
15. See, e.g., British Airways Plc, DOT Consent Order 2012-10-1 (2012); see e.g., Qantas Airways Ltd.,
DOT Consent Order 2012-10-12 (2012); see e.g., Soci6t6 Air France, DOT Consent Order 2012-11-1 (2012).
16. This provision in EAPP #2 amended 14 C.F.R. § 399.84, which has, since 1984, required any advertisement for air transportation to state the "entire price to be paid by the customer to the air carrier." 49 Fed.
Reg. 49,440 (Dec. 20, 1984) (now codified as amended at 14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a) (2012). Prior to adopting the
final EAPP #2, however, by longstanding enforcement policy, DOT had allowed government-imposed taxes
and fees collected by carriers and ticket agents (such as passenger facility charges and departure taxes) to be
stated separately from base fares in advertisements, provided such taxes and fees were not ad valorem (i.e., not
assessed as a percentage of the fare price), were collected on a per-passenger basis, and their existence and
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for air transportation disclose the entire price to be paid, including all taxes, governmentimposed fees, and mandatory airline- and ticket agent-imposed fees. Other enforcement
cases involved alleged noncompliance with consumer rule provisions regulating tarmac
delay contingency plans, customer service plans,17 and baggage fee disclosures.' 8
Aviation stakeholders hoping for some judicial relief from the requirements of EAPP #2
were disappointed when a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit upheld three EAPP #2 provisions: (1) the Full Fare Rule; (2) the
Twenty-Four Hour Refund Rule, which requires air carriers to either hold reservations
without payment for twenty-four hours or to provide refunds to passengers who cancel a
reservation within twenty-four hours of booking; and (3) the Post-Purchase Price Rule,
which prohibits post-payment increases to the price of airline tickets, carry-on luggage, or
the first two checked bags, that were challenged by Spirit Airlines, Allegiant Air, and
Southwest Airlines19 as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
(the APA). 20 Most of the court's opinion dealt with the Full Fare Rule, which was also
challenged on the ground that it violated the airlines' First Amendment right to engage in
commercial and political speech. 2 1 The majority concluded that the petitioners had offered no basis for finding that the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it decided
to enforce the original 1984 language in 14 C.F.R. § 399.84 (now codified in 14 C.F.R.
§ 399.84(a)) "by requiring that airlines actually add the taxes to the base fare and disclose
the total price." 22 Similarly, the majority rejected the petitioners' claim that requiring the
total, final price to be the most prominently listed figure "hardly amounts to an arbitrary
23
Adexercise of DOT's statutory authority to prevent 'unfair or deceptive practice[s].'"
ditionally, the majority rejected the airlines' First Amendment claims, concluding that the
Full Fare Rule "does not prohibit airlines from saying anything; it just requires them to
disclose the total, final price and to make it the most prominent figure in their advertisements ... this neither prohibits nor significantly burdens airlines' ability to provide that
information." 24 All three judges agreed that the Twenty-Four Hour Refund Rule properly
regulates airline cancellation policies, with the majority noting that DOT developed it "as
amounts were clearly indicated at the first point in the advertisements where a fare was presented. See 75 Fed.
Reg. 32,318 (June 8, 2010) (explaining DOT enforcement policy concerning the 1984 rule).
17. See, e.g., Air India, Ltd., DOT Order 2012-5-4 (2012) (fining Air India $80,000, in part, for failing to
post its plans on its website by the August 23, 2011 enforcement deadline).
18. See, e.g., Concesionaria Vuela Compania de Aviacion, S.A.P.I. de CV., DOT Order 2012-6-15 (2012)
(fining Volaris $130,000, in part, for advertising fares on its website without providing a link to potentially
applicable baggage fees on the first screen on which a fare quotation appeared).
19. Southwest contested only the Full Fare Rule. None of the petitioners challenged the original 1984 full
fare rule.
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 5928334 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2012) (No. 12-656).
21. See generally Spirit Airlines, 687 F.3d at 403. Judge Tatel wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judge
Henderson. Judge Randolph, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have held that the Full Fare
Rule "violates the First Amendment." Id. at 419-24. Accordingly, Judge Randolph "dissent[ed] from the
majority opinion to the extent that it upholds the rule prohibiting sellers of air transportation from prominently displaying government taxes and fees," but concurred with the remainder of the majority opinion. Id.
at 424 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 410. (majority op.).
23. Id. at 411.
24. Id. at 414.
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part of a systematic effort aimed at preventing unfair and deceptive practices." 25 They
also agreed that it was reasonable for DOT to implement the Post-Purchase Price Rule as
a means to prevent the "bait and switch" practice of increasing the prices for baggage after
the purchase of a ticket that DOT had found to be unfair and deceptive. 26
On November 21, 2012, Spirit, Allegiant, and Southwest jointly petitioned for certiorari
asking the Supreme Court to hear their challenge to the Twenty-Four Hour Refund Rule
and the Full Fare Rule. 27 The Airlines argued that DOT violated the First Amendment
by mandating "total cost" advertising and restricting airlines' truthful speech about the
large and expanding share of government taxes and fees of the total price of each ticket.
They also contested that DOT exceeded its statutory mandate and acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by re-regulating down to the size of typeface for advertising purposes and the
time period for mandatory refunds with respect to the aviation industry, which Congress
has expressly chosen to deregulate. 28 The Airlines further criticized DOT for "recently
promulgatfing] a number of new rules, with more in the offing, that seek to micro-manage
the business decisions of this highly competitive industry." 29
DOT's consumer protection efforts will continue in full force in 2013 with the Department's anticipated issuance of: (1) a proposed third consumer rule (EAPP #3) that is expected to impose an even broader set of reporting and disclosure requirements on airlines
and ticket agents;3o (2) a final rule: (a) requiring airlines to report more detailed revenue
information on nineteen categories of ancillary fees collected from passengers, (b) changing the way mishandled baggage rates are computed and reported, and (c) requiring airlines to report separate statistics on mishandled wheelchairs and scooters; 3' (3) a final rule
requiring U.S. and foreign air carriers and U.S. airports to make their websites and automated kiosks more accessible to passengers with disabilities; 32 (4) a final rule banning
25. Id. at 416.
26. Id. at 417. During the judicial challenge, DOT informed the court that it would "undertake a new
notice-and-comment procedure before enforcing the post-purchase price increase provision to any ancillary
service other than the carriage of carry-on-baggage and the first and second checked bag." Id. (citing Brief
for Respondent at 51).
27. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Spirit Airlines, 2012 WL 5928334 (No. 12-656).
28. Id. at *ii. The airlines did not challenge the post-purchase prohibition in view of DOT's announcement
that it would not apply the rule to ancillary fees without further rulemaking. See id. at n.7.
29. Id. at 2.
30. A supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) for EAPP #3 is expected in March 2013.
The SNPRM, which is a continuation of previous EAPP rulemakings, is expected to include proposals concerning: (1) the display of ancillary fees through all sale channels; (2) requiring tarmac delay coordination
between marketing and operating carriers; (3) additional disclosure and reporting requirements for codeshare
operations, ticket agents, smaller carriers, and substantial fees; (4) minimum customer service standards for
travel agents; and (5) the prohibition of post-purchase price increases for services and products not purchased
with the ticket.
31. See ReportingAncillary Airline Passenger Revenues, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (jul. 15, 2011) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pt. 27). The comment period on this proposal ended September 13, 2011. Id. A final rule is
expected in May 2013. On May 17, 2012, DOT convened a public meeting to give airlines and other interested parties an opportunity to voice concerns about the proposed rule. At the meeting, airline representatives expressed strong opposition to it-citing operational and cost concerns as well as the potential for
customer inconvenience-while representatives from consumer organizations largely supported the proposal
and DOT's purported objective of enhancing market transparency. See 77 Fed. Reg. 25,105 (Apr. 27, 2012).
32. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel. Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at
U.S. Airports,76 Fed. Reg. 59,307 (Sept. 26, 2011) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 27). The comment period
on this proposal ended Nov. 25, 2011. Id. A final rule is expected in January 2013.
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smoking of electronic cigarettes on aircraft;33 (5) new requirements regarding the accessibility of airports, covering subjects including service animal relief areas, closed captioning
of televisions, and audio-visual displays for airports;34 and (6) new requirements regarding
the accessibility of aircraft, covering subjects including carrier-supplied medical oxygen,
35
in-flight entertainment systems, service animals, and lavatories.
B.

RESPONSE TO THE EURoPEAN

UNION's

EmiSSIONs TRADING SCHEME

On January 1, 2012, the European Union officially expanded the scope of its emissions
trading system (ETS), to include carbon emissions from the aviation sector. The ETS
legislation36 requires all aircrafts flying in or out of an airport situated in the territory of
an EU Member State-regardless of the operator's homeland-to account for each ton of
37
CO 2 emitted during the flight. Issues regarding the applicability of the ETS to non-EU
operators and, in particular, the requirement that such operators surrender emission allowances based on the entire journey-including portions over the high seas and non-EU
countries-have drawn considerable opposition from stakeholders in the international aviation community,3 8 especially U.S. airlines and regulators.39 Indeed, DOT issued an order in late 2011 expressing its strong objection to the inclusion of U.S. aircraft operators
33. Smoking of Electronic Cigarettes on Aircraft, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,008 (Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 252). The comment period on this proposal ended November 14, 2011. Id. A final rule is expected in April 2013.
34. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Programsor Activities Receiving FederalFinancialAssistance
(U.S. Airports), 76 Fed. Reg. 60,426 (Sept. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 27). The comment
period on this proposal ended November 28, 2011. Id. A final rule is expected in May 2013.
35. An SNPRM is expected in June 2013.
36. The EU's first legislative effort to extend the ETS to include the aviation sector occurred in 2006. The
legislation that gave rise to the current scheme was adopted by the twenty-seven Member States and the
European Parliament in 2008. See Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, 2009 OJ. (L 8) 3, available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0003:EN:PDF.
37. Under the ETS, airlines receive tradable allowances for a certain amount of CO 2 emissions from their
flights per year. At the end of the year, operators must surrender ETS allowances for the total CO2 emissions
associated with all flights operated to and from points in EU Member States, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Any surplus allowances may be sold or saved to cover future emissions. See id. at 13.
38. From July 31 to August 1, 2012, the U.S. Departments of State and Transportation hosted representatives from sixteen countries to discuss alternatives to the controversial scheme, including: Russia, India,
China, Australia, Canada, Brazil, Chile, Singapore, UAE, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the U.S. and Nigeria. See U.S. Dep't State, Senior Official, Background Briefing: Senior
Administration Official Provides a Readout of the European Union Emissions Trading System (ETS) Meeting (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/195960.htm.
39. Industry group Airlines for America, Inc. (the A4A) and several leading U.S. airlines challenged the
ETS in the U.K High Court on the grounds that it exceeded the authority of State jurisdiction with respect
to flights that take place, in part, outside the EU, in violation of international law. See The Queen on the
Application of Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Sec'y of State for Energy and Climate Change, [2010]
EWHC (Admin) 1554 [1]. In a judgment delivered on December 21, 2011, the EU Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the directive's inclusion of aviation activities in the ETS and, in doing so, dismissed
assertions that the scheme is incompatible with the principles of international law and/or agreements. See
Case C-336/10, Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Sec'y of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011
E.C.R. 00000.
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under the EU legislation on legal and policy grounds and directing seven major U.S.
carriers to report for DOT's consideration certain ETS-related information. 40
In November 2012, as a "gesture of goodwill in support of an international solution" to
aircraft emissions and in response to what it perceived to be "encouraging discussions" in
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council on a global, market-based
approach to regulating aircraft emissions, the European Commission (EC) announced it
would be deferring application of the ETS to flights to and from Europe until after the
ICAO General Assembly in autumn 2013.41 "The legislation will continue to apply to all
flights within and between the 30 European countries in the EU ETS."42
Notwithstanding the EU's so-called "stop the clock" gesture, U.S. legislators joined in
opposition to ETS by passing a bill on November 14, 2012 that not only shields U.S.
airlines from the ETS, but also prohibits them from complying with EU rules.43 In particular, the bill, which President Obama signed into law on November 27, 2012,44 requires the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to prohibit U.S. civil aircraft operators from
participating in the EU ETS in any case in which he deems the prohibition to be in the
public interest, encourages the Secretary and other Federal officials to conduct international negotiations to pursue a worldwide approach to address aircraft emissions, and requires those officials to hold operators of U.S. civil aircraft harmless from the EU ETS.45
The new law was welcomed enthusiastically by the U.S. airline industry and may serve as a
model for other countries opposed to the EU scheme.46

40. See In re European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), DOT Order 2011-12-9 (2011) (directing
American, Continental, Delta, Federal Express, United, UPS, and US Airways to report: the free 2012 allowances allocated and received; an estimate of allowances needed for 2012 operations covered by ETS; the
2012 CO2 emissions reported to the administering state; the monetary amount paid to the administering state
in ETS allowance auctions; and the monetary amount spent or received in ETS allowance markets).
41. Press Release, European Commission, Stopping the Clock of ETS and Aviation Emissions Following
Last Week's International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council (Nov. 12, 2012), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release.MEMO-12-854 en.htm; see Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector,
CLIMATE ACTION - EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transportlaviationlindex-

en.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 2012).
42. See Reducing Emissionsfrom the Aviation Sector, supra note 41.
43. See European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-200, 126
Stat. 1477 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-l12sl956enr/pdf/BILLS-112sl956enr.
pdf.
44. See Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 2006, H.R. 4114, S. 743 and
S. 1956 (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/27/statement-press-secretaryhr-2606-hr-4114-s-743-and-s-1956.
45. 126 Stat. 1477.
46. See Press Release, Airlines for America, A4A Commends Presidential Signature of Bipartisan Bill Rejecting Illegal EU ETS Scheme (Nov. 27, 2012), http-//www.airlines.org/Pages/A4A-Commends-Presiden
tial-Signature-of-Bipartisan-Bill-Rejecting-Illegal-EU-ETS-Scheme.aspx (commending the enactment of the
law and reiterating the importance of achieving a global, market-based solution within the framework of
ICAO).

SPRING 2013

